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Abstract 
 
The process of regulation and supervision of the financial system represents a 
pillar for the financial stability. A recent trend in the institutional framework for financial 
supervision is the creation of a Single Supervision Authority for the supervision of the 
banking sector, the insurances and the capital markets. In the financial supervision 
literature, a lot of arguments highlight the fact that such institutions are necessary, but 
there are also other valid arguments which show that the banking supervision must be 
made by central banks. Taking into account these arguments we show that the 
institutional regulation and supervision framework reflects the structure of the Romanian 
financial system and the specialized supervision architecture in place in Romania is 
compatible with the European supervision framework. The National Bank of Romania has 
a solid experience in banking sector supervision and the activity of financial 
conglomerates is not yet a menace for the Romanian financial system stability. That is 
why the implementation of a unified supervision framework does not represent an optimal 
solution at the moment.  
 
Key words: supervision framework, single supervision authority, central banks, 
financial conglomerates.  
JEL classification: E58, F55, G28 
 
Introduction 
 
The process of regulation and supervision of the financial system represents a 
pillar for the financial stability. Many specialists consider that the establishment of a 
Single Supervision Authority (SSA) is necessary in order to preserve the financial system 
stability. Such authorities are independent from central banks and their role is the 
regulation and supervision of all financial sectors, including the banks. The aim of the 
SSA implementation is the demarcation between the two goals of central banks, price 
stability and financial stability, and the elimination of the trade-off between these 
objectives. It is considered that a SSA is also specialized in financial conglomerates 
supervision, a new challenge for the financial stability. 
The construction of a unique supervision authority does not represent an 
optimal solution in all the cases. These authorities do not have the necessary means of 
intervention to guarantee the financial stability and they can be subject to political 
pressure because they act as governmental agencies or agencies subordinated to the 
Parliament. It seems that the central banks are better placed to regulate and survey the 
banking sector, enjoying the required independence and credibility. 
During the last period, intense debates were conducted regarding the possibility 
to reorganise the regulation and supervision framework, both at European and national 
level. A priori we can not say that a certain supervision framework is performing better, 
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even if there is an obvious trend among European countries to unify the regulation and 
the supervision of different financial sectors. The decision for a SSA implementation 
must take into consideration the characteristics of each national financial system.  
In this study we intend to show that the Romanian supervision architecture in 
place is compatible with the financial system structure and that the National Bank of 
Romania (NBR) can not successfully accomplish its financial stability objective without 
performing the regulation and supervision of the banking sector. Moreover, the actual 
supervision framework enables an efficient cooperation with the corresponding 
authorities in place at European level. 
The structure of the study is the following: in the first section we analyse the 
characteristics required for a regulation and supervision authority to be efficient. In the 
next sections we present the arguments supporting the preservation of a fundamental role 
for central banks in banking supervision and we continue with the arguments in favour of 
a SSA in the third section. In the fourth section we analyse the European regulation and 
supervision framework. In the last section of this article we will present the status of 
unified supervision in several European countries and we will demonstrate that financial 
supervision architecture in Romania is compatible with the structure of the financial 
system and with the European arrangements. The implementation of a Mixed Supervision 
Committee by the members of the NBR and the members of the others supervision 
authorities, under the NBR coordination, represents at present a better solution than 
setting up a SSA in the Romanian case. Finally we conclude.  
 
1. Requirements for the regulation and supervision authorities 
 
Even if we do not implicitly embrace from the very beginning the assumption 
that the best solution is to keep the supervision of the banking sector within the central 
bank, we must say that this function should be complementary to other financial stability 
related functions, named “the safety nets” (Cerna et al., 2008: p.68): deposit insurance, 
lender of last resort and payment systems administration. 
The supervision authorities must analyse objectively the financial conditions of 
each financial institution and of the financial system as a whole. Their impartiality can 
not be achieved without a high level of political and institutional independence. A 
supervision authority must also be credible because its regulations and decisions must be 
respected. The credibility and transparency of its actions ensure the independence, and, 
on the other hand, an independent supervision authority becomes more credible. The 
supervision authorities must be accountable for their actions and should not be exposed to 
moral hazard. The accountability must not interfere with their independence. The 
transparency, the accountability, the independence and the credibility characterise 
successful central banks in their effort to reduce inflation and, at the same time, represent 
the attributes of an efficient supervision authority. 
Most of the literature focuses on analysing the transparency, the credibility and 
the independence of central banks in relation with the prices stability goal. We consider 
that these elements must also characterise the regulation and supervision authorities. An 
independent supervision authority can ensure the financial stability by offering adequate 
guarantees to the financial sector, especially under extreme conditions.  
1.1. The transparency 
In the economic literature, several forms of transparency necessary for a 
supervision authority are mentioned: political transparency (established objectives), 
economic transparency (data and models), procedural transparency (decisions and votes), 
operational transparency and transparency related to the results of applied policies. 
Central Bank or Single Financial Supervision Authority: The Romanian Case 
 
 3 
The transparency is a condition necessary for the central banks’ independence 
and also for the supervision authority’s independence (Ribeiro, 2002: p.5). The authority 
engaged in financial regulation and supervision must continuously inform the government 
and the public, at least in the same manner the central banks provide information about 
the monetary policy programme. 
Nevertheless, it is important to make a distinction between monetary policy 
transparency and financial supervision transparency. In the first case, a total transparency 
is not recommended (Eichengreen and Dincer, 2006: p.26)1. The central banks are not 
always transparent in their monetary policy decisions. Cerna (2002: p.26) speaks about 
central banks’ secrecy, concept theorized for the first time by Goodfriend. By adopting 
this practice, the central bank reduces the transparency and obtains a decrease in the 
interest rate variability, making the economic agents less sensitive to changes in the 
monetary policy. Unlike monetary policy transparency, the transparency of supervision 
authorities’ activity must be substantial. 
The debates about transparency are meant to increase the efficiency of 
supervision authorities in achieving their objectives. The increase in transparency level is 
partially associated with the efforts undertaken to enhance the accountability. The 
transparency of established strategies and decisions can make the economic agents 
understand the present situation of the monetary policy and of the supervision framework. 
The transparency represents a pre-condition for the accountability (Schich and Seitz, 
1999: p.9). 
1.2. The accountability 
Another requirement for a supervision authority to accomplish its objectives is 
the accountability of its actions. The accountability means the obligation to explain and 
justify the actions and decisions, in terms of certain criteria, and the obligation to assume 
the responsibility for making decisions. The supervision authority accountability 
contributes to the elimination of potential conflicts between this institution and the 
government.  
Quintyn and Taylor (2004: pp.15-16) consider that “the accountability of 
independent regulators and supervisors is the key for their effective independence”. 
These specialists enumerate several criteria to be taken into consideration in order to 
achieve a real accountability: 
• a clear legal basis; 
• a clear and public statement of the objectives, as for example, preserving 
the stability of the financial system and the soundness of individual banks; 
• the relationships with the executive, legislative and judicial bodies must 
be clearly defined; 
• the appointment, replacement and dismissal of senior officials must 
respect a transparent procedure. 
1.3. The independence  
The independence of the supervision agencies represents a feature which is 
intensely analysed in the economic literature. The successful results obtained by the 
central banks in their battle against inflation stimulated the interest for the supervision 
authority’s independence.   
The independence is essential to counteract the natural predilection of 
politicians to expansionist economic policies. The politicians make promises in the short-
                                                 
1
 Eichengreen said, when he was asked about the optimal level of central banks transparency 
concerning the monetary policy in a Centre Cournot Conference in Paris, 2006: „somewhere fewer 
than 50 percent”. 
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run for obtaining electoral benefits and at the same time they exacerbate the long term 
financial situation.  Thereby, the politicians can make pressure on the control authority to 
avoid the declaration of a bankruptcy. The independence of the supervision authorities 
represents for the financial stability what the independence of central bank means for the 
monetary stability, and the independence of these institutions allows them to strengthen 
each other. Both organisms provide a safety net – the financial stability. The 
independence of the supervision authority does not represent a target by itself, but it has 
an important contribution to achieving the statutory objectives. 
In the economic literature several types of independence are approached. 
Schich and Seitz (1999: p.6) identify the institutional independence, the staff and the 
functional independence. Lybek (2004: pp.3-4) prefers the term “autonomy” to the 
frequently used term “independence” of central banks. He makes a distinction between 
several types of autonomy: goal autonomy (the central bank authority may determine its 
primary objective among several objectives included in the central bank law); target 
autonomy (there is one clearly defined primary objective stipulated in the law); 
instrument autonomy (implies the fact that the government decides the monetary policy 
target, in agreement with the central bank) and limited or no autonomy (means that the 
central bank is almost a government agency). 
A supervision agency decisions must not be influenced by the intervention of 
the ministers or of the Parliament. The agency must also have the necessary power and 
authority to act in its relation with the supervised firms (Abraham and Taylor, 2000: p.6). 
These prerogatives refer at least to: the possibility to ask for pertinent information from 
the regulated institutions, the capacity to assess the competences of superior management 
and shareholders, the possibility to apply penalties in case of infringement of the rules or 
even the possibility to intervene in the activity of the regulated institutions, if the case 
may be. 
An important weight is given to the financial independence of the supervision 
authority. The fulfilment of the financial stability goal can lead to a financial loss if this 
authority acts as a lender of last resort (LOLR). If the authority does not dispose of the 
necessary financial resources, it can become the target of political pressure. 
Quintyn and Taylor (2004: pp.8-9) identify four levels of independence of the 
regulation and supervision authority: 
1) The financial sector regulation independence means that the agencies 
accountable must have sufficient autonomy to design the prudential and regulation rules, 
characteristics for the financial intermediation activity. 
2)  The control independence is crucial in the financial system and it is very 
difficult to ensure it. The control authorities work in close relation with the financial 
firms both for the inspection and control of the last ones, and for setting the penalty.  
3) The institutional independence refers to the supervision authority statute, 
outside the executive and legislative power and entails three critic elements. In the first 
place, the staff should benefit from the work place stability – the employment and 
especially the revocation must be done based on clear rules, with the implication of two 
different organisms. In the second place, the structure of the control authority 
management must include several specialist teams. In the third place, the decision must 
be taken in a transparent way, but keeping in the same time the commercial 
confidentiality.  
4) The budgetary independence depends on the role of legislative and executive 
power in the construction of the authority’s budget. The political pressures through 
budget must be avoided. Some control authorities finance their activity with the fees paid 
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by the controlled institutions. This practice limits the political immixture but increases the 
financial dependence towards controlled institutions. 
1.4. The credibility 
The credibility has the same importance for the supervision agency and for the 
monetary authority. A credible supervision authority has a better resistance towards 
political pressures and its regulations are better implemented by the private sector. In case 
a financial crisis occurs, the LOLR function can be accomplish only by a credible central 
bank, if the intended result is to limit the moral hazard. 
Waller and De Haan (2004: pp.10-11) present the result of an opinion survey 
made among several private sector economists, in relation with the central banks 
credibility and transparency. They reach the conclusion that a credible central bank: may 
reduce the inflation at a lower social cost and can easier maintain it at the desired level; 
can act as a LOLR without being threatened in case of unaccomplished goals; can find 
public support to ensure its independence. In the same way, the credibility of a 
supervision authority inhibits the decisions vulnerability. The financial institutions 
respect a trusty authority and wish to collaborate with it. The results obtained by the 
authors are influenced by the reputation of the analysed central banks.  
In conclusion, the regulation and supervision authority’s objectives must be 
clear and this authority must establish its own strategies and intervention instruments. 
The goals need to be extremely clear in order to avoid the trade-off between its 
objectives. An independent authority may enjoy of the necessary credibility.  
The transparency, the accountability, the independence and the credibility are 
necessary but they do not represent the only attributes which must characterise a 
supervision authority. Other features must be taken into consideration, such as: the 
capacity to rapidly adapt to a changing environment, the agency efficiency and capability 
to avoid the regulation arbitration (in case the authority surveys more than one financial 
sector). In this case, the debate focuses on the arguments in favour of the integration of 
the regulation and supervision function within the central banks and on the arguments 
which concur to the implementation of a SSA.    
 
2. Arguments for the integration of the supervision function within central 
banks 
 
Central Banks objectives related to price stability and to financial stability are 
correlated in our opinion, although a compromise between these two objectives may 
appear on short term.  
According to some authors, the periods of banking fragility are not generally 
periods in which the inflationist pressures are important, fact that diminishes the 
importance of the argument stating that there is a synergy between the two objectives of 
central banks (Mishkin, 2001: p.63). There are also authors sustaining the need to 
maintain the banking system supervision function within the central bank, an opinion 
which we also agree. Bieri (2004: p.3), quoting Tinbergen, asserts that if the central bank 
has only one instrument available, namely the monetary policy, it can achieve only one 
purpose – the objective related to price stability. Therefore, if the objective related to 
financial stability stays with the central bank’s responsibilities, the latter has to supervise 
the banking system. Any banking sector supervision regime has to make a connection 
between the supervision activity and the central bank, due to the liaisons between price 
stability and financial stability (Masciandaro, 2004: p.5). 
The banking regulation was practically implemented by the central bank to 
ensure the financial sector stability (Quintyn and Taylor, 2004: p.2). For the non-banking 
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financial sector (capital market, insurances, pensions funds), the regulation is usually 
ensured either by a ministry or by a specialized organism within the central 
administration. As we can observe, the achievement of both price and financial stability 
stands for a traditional duty of central banks and of other supervision agencies, but the 
fulfilment of these twin objectives is not possible without a close cooperation between 
these regulation and supervision bodies. Consequently, if one institution exercises both 
functions, the cooperation problem no longer exists. If the task related to financial 
stability maintenance was delegated to the central bank, the objectives of the stability 
function must be clearly stated and defined, stipulated in laws or other regulations 
(Oosterloo and De Haan, 2004: pp.260-261).   
A combined monetary policy and banking control regime has specific 
advantages in terms of systemic stability: the information gathered by central banks from 
their supervision missions related to payment systems and monetary markets favours the 
detection of banks’ treasury difficulties, while the availability of prudential information 
enables a quicker intervention and a better management of the moral hazard related to 
liquidity injections, in the framework of LOLR actions.  
In our opinion there is an obvious synergy between the supervision function 
and the monetary policy function, because the information collected during the banks 
supervision process helps and leads to the increase of macroeconomic forecasts. The 
accuracy of the forecasts related to macroeconomic variables is essential for the monetary 
policy, as it is a prospective policy. Sinclair (2000: p.388) underlines the synergy between 
the central bank objectives, namely prices stability and financial stability. The author 
states that the transition to a more reliable financial control regime will involve a lower 
level of the equilibrium prices, no matter the trajectory of the monetary aggregates. 
The ECB (2001: pp.4-6) study shows that in terms of prudential surveillance, 
the central bank analyzes, apart from the soundness of individual institutions, the 
implications on systemic risk, while a SSA mainly carries out actions to protect the 
depositors and the investors. Comparisons are performed, in the same study, between the 
arguments in favour or against the integration of the banking supervision function within 
the central bank. The arguments in favour of this integration are: 
a) The synergy of the information between the supervision function and the 
central bank’s fundamental missions. This argument underlines the importance the 
confidential information gathered during the prudential control can have for the payment 
systems and for the good conduct of the monetary policy. Equally, the prudential 
information related to institutions susceptible to foster the systemic risk is crucial for 
macroprudential surveillance. Moreover, if a crisis appears in the banking system and the 
central bank has to intervene, it can react based on prudential information being familiar 
with the particular status of a bank that needs liquidities. Getting this information 
indirectly, through a SSA, may lead to misinterpretations.  
b) The particular emphasis on systemic risk. There is a close connection 
between the prudential control on each intermediary and the assessment of the systemic 
risk. Even in case a SSA exists, the central bank has a significant role in terms of 
systemic financial stability. The central bank can better assess not only the probability of 
potential incidents related to macroeconomic shocks, or the turbulences on the markets, 
but also other factors that affect financial stability, as for example, groups of 
intermediaries.  
c) The independence and technical expertise. This argument underlines the 
quality of the contribution the central banks can bring to financial system stability. The 
independence of the supervision authority in relation with political interference is 
important for ensuring the efficiency of the surveillance activity.  
Central Bank or Single Financial Supervision Authority: The Romanian Case 
 
 7 
The arguments in favour of keeping the banking sector supervision function 
within the central bank are often stated as arguments against the set up of a SSA. Taylor 
and Abraham (2000: pp.16-18) enumerate some arguments in this respect and speak 
about a so-called “Pandora’s box”2. The author’s explanations are rather related to the 
risks involved by the set up of a SSA and to the fact that the reasons underlying such 
decisions are not well-founded. 
a) The objectives may be unclear. One of the strongest arguments advanced 
against the unification of supervision functions within a SSA is the difficulty to find the 
equilibrium between the different objectives of the regulation. Due to their diversity – 
from the protection against systemic risk to investors’ protection – it is possible that a 
unique regulation authority can not clearly focus on rational objectives and can not make 
the difference when it comes for the regulation of different types of institutions. 
b) Diseconomies of scale. Economies of scale represent an important argument 
in favour of a Single Supervision Agency, but we have to admit that diseconomies can 
also occur. A source of inefficiency can appear due to the fact that a single agency is in a 
monopole position, and the new structure can be more rigid and more bureaucratic. 
Another source for scale diseconomies is the “Christmas tree effect”. This happens 
because politicians can be tempted to assign them tasks connected to the main functions. 
For example, in Scandinavian countries, the agencies have been assigned tasks related to 
the supervision of the brokers on real estate markets.     
c) Limited synergies. Some critics of the unification indicate a reduced gain 
caused by the unification, namely the economies of scope are probably less significant 
than the economies of scale. For example, the banks’ risk source lies with the assets side 
of the balance sheet, while most of the insurance companies’ risks are related to the 
balance sheet liabilities side. In addition, the supervision procedures for two financial 
sectors are different.  
d) Moral hazard. Maybe the most alarming argument against the unification is 
the moral hazard. It is based on the assumption that the public will suppose that all the 
creditors of the supervised institutions will receive equal protection.   
An element which is not put forward in the cost-benefit analyses in the 
economic literature is the fact that most of central banks are charged with financial 
stability. Financial stability has both a macroeconomic and a microeconomic dimension, 
closely correlated. In case the central bank will no longer ensure the microeconomic 
stability (stability achieved by means of the regulation and supervision functions) it is 
very difficult to manage the systemic stability. 
Moreover, if the central bank will have price stability as its unique objective, 
this does not mean that its fulfilment will be easy to attain. Central bank’s actions would 
                                                 
2
 Within “Pandora’s Box”, four types of risks involved by the eventual set up of a SSA are 
presented. One of the risks comes from the political sector, some politicians considering this 
unification process as an opportunity to increase their influence. The second risk is a legislative 
one. The establishment of a single supervision agency will imply the need to change the 
legislation, but this situation can make possible the capture of the process by certain interest 
groups. Another disadvantage of the unification is the eventuality not to solve the discrepancies in 
the regulation. A third risk caused by the change is the possible reduction of the regulation 
capacity due to the loss of key personnel. Part of the employees will consider the unification 
process difficult and they prefer to avoid it. In this way, some of them, even if they are good 
experts, can feel threaten and look for other jobs or choose to retire. A fourth risk is the change of 
the management, which could slow down the regulation process. The unification of the 
surveillance supposes a need of human resources – management staff – exactly in environments 
were there is a lack of such personnel. 
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depend far too much on the fiscal policy as well as on the existence of an efficient 
supervision framework. That is why the cooperation with the political authorities and the 
central bank’s involvement in the systemic financial stability will represent the key for 
achieving the purposes of this institution.  
However, the integration of the banking sector supervision within the central 
bank does not represent always an optimal solution. There are also arguments according 
to which it is recommended that the supervision of the entire financial system should be 
performed by a SSA. Thus, in systems characterized by the existence of complex capital 
markets, where it is difficult to delimit the sectoral activities, the informational benefits 
gained by a central bank can be reduced. In addition, the presence of financial 
conglomerates together with the lack of central bank’s experience in the supervision 
activity recommends the set up of a SSA.  
 
3. Arguments for setting up a Single Supervision Agency 
 
Apparently, the best way to ensure the independence of the regulation and 
banking control authority is to integrate this function within an independent central bank. 
As the independence of the central bank is widely accepted nowadays, the single control 
authority could enjoy, in its turn, of this independence. Therefore, an alternative to the 
integration within the central banks of the function related to the regulation and 
supervision of the banking sector is to set up a distinct single supervision authority, 
responsible for the supervision of banking, securities and insurance sectors. There is an 
increasing trend in respect of the creation of unique supervision bodies, fact that obliges 
the decision making and legislative bodies to review the institutional provisions, in order 
to guarantee their independence.   
Masciandaro (2004: pp.2-3) performs a cost-benefit analysis related to the 
constitution of a SSA and he reaches the conclusion that there is no superior supervision 
framework, even if a trend to concentrate the financial supervision regimes has been 
lately observed: Norway (1986), Island, Austria, Denmark (1988), Sweden (1991), 
England and Korea (1997), Latvia (1998), Estonia (1999), Hungary (2000), Japan (2001), 
Malta (2002), Germany (2002) and Belgium (2004). This cost-benefit analysis is 
described in Table 1: 
 
Table 1: The traditional cost-benefit analysis applied to the constitution of a SSA   
 Expected benefits Expected costs 
Authority – Regulated 
firms relationships 
Supervision costs and 
supervision arbitrage – decrease    
Capture risks and innovation 
disincentives – increase   
Authority – political system 
relationships 
Independence gains – increase   Capture risks – increase   
Economies of scale – increase   Diseconomies of scale – 
increase 
Authority – internal 
organization  
Goal conflicts and 
internalization benefits – 
increase   
Goal conflicts and 
internalization benefits – 
increase   
Financial services 
customers  
Confidence benefits – increase  Overconfidence costs – 
increase    
Source: Masciandaro (2004: p.5)  
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Goodhart (2004: pp.5-6), promoting the supervision structure in England, 
shows that each institution (Central Bank, FSA3 and Treasury) has clear established tasks 
in relation with the financial stability. The FSA is a supervision authority responsible for 
the supervision of individual financial institutions, while the central bank has the 
responsibility to ensure a good functioning of the payments system and, by extension, the 
responsibility for the supervision of the structure and soundness of the settlement and 
clearing system of the main financial markets: bonds market, foreign exchange market 
and, maybe to a smaller extent, the stock market. The author considers this function 
separation process a more complicated but maybe more “democratic” process.  
The arguments in favour of the set up of a SSA are as numerous as those 
militating for the integration of the supervision function within the central banks. These 
arguments comprise a potential conflict between monetary policy objectives and financial 
stability objectives and the arguments in favour of the maintenance of a formal role for 
the central bank (the case of Bundesbank for example) refer to the synergy and 
circulation of information, in particular the maintenance of the appropriate functioning of 
the payment system.  
Gulde and Wolf (2004: p.60) sustain only a formal involvement of the central 
bank in the supervision activity. The authors consider that a number of factors argue for a 
gradualist approach initially focusing only on the small subset of banks that can be 
described as multinational: 
• the case for a multi-lateral supervisor depends on the importance of cross-
border activity, spillovers and externalities; 
• the potential problems identified in theory refer however to the current 
system of national supervision, determined by the commercial bank headquarter location 
and to the extensive need of coordination in respect of additional information flow; 
• in the near future European banking and insurance concerns will 
experience substantial change in the wake of Basel II, Solvency II, and revisions of 
International Accounting Standards (IAS). 
ECB (2001: pp.6-8) also elaborated a list of arguments in favour of the 
segregation of the price stability function from the supervision function and they 
identified three main elements in this respect: 
a) The conflict of interests between supervision and monetary policy. A 
prudential concern related to the fragility of the banking system can determine the central 
bank to adopt a more lax monetary policy and not to pay attention to the achievement of 
the inflation objective, in particular in case a crisis occurs. The fundamental argument in 
this respect is that through the maintenance of price stability, financial stability is de facto 
ensured. Consequently, financial instability is taken into account only if and to the extent 
that it affects the inflation objectives.    
b) The emergence of financial conglomerates. This argument has often been 
analysed during recent debates. During the last years, the close connections between 
banks, insurances and capital market make hard to distinguish between the individual 
activities of each financial conglomerate. A sectoral control can prove less efficient in 
this situation due to arbitrage problems4. 
c) The concentration of power within the central bank. The assignment of the 
regulation and supervision tasks to an independent central bank can be considered 
                                                 
3
 Financial Services Authority – represents the SSA for the United Kingdom.  
4
 This refers to the possibility a company has to concentrate its activity in certain branches of the 
conglomerate with the purpose to get in or out of the supervision area of a certain regulation and 
supervision authority. The creation of a SSA would eliminate this possibility. 
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prejudicial due to possible abuses. The central bank can become an excessively 
bureaucratic institution.   
Most of the studies pleading for the set up of a SSA are carried out by 
researchers from countries where a SSA already exists. The study performed by HFSA 
(2000: pp.1-17) joins the same direction. The strongest argument for the constitution of 
HFSA in 2000 was the improvement of the efficiency of consolidated supervision, and 
the improved management of the integrated agency was defined as an important task of 
the reforming reorganisation process. The management of HFSA contributed to the 
increase of financial actors’ reliability and the merger of the regulation agencies 
highlighted the fact that certain provisions of the legislation specific for each supervised 
institution contradicted one another or they included unjustified discrepancies. The set up 
of a SSA remedied this situation.   
Another argument in favour of the separation between the supervision and 
monetary function is the passage to universal banks which makes difficult for the central 
bank to separate or to make the distinction between the financial institutions which can or 
cannot benefit from the safety nets offered by the central bank. 
Briault (2002: pp.6-7) advances a series of elements in favour of the 
unification: economies of scale, emergency of financial conglomerates, but also: 
- Neutralization of the arbitrage. There are cases in which financial institutions 
supplying similar services or products are supervised by different authorities. This 
situation can involve the location of a certain financial service or product in that area of 
the financial conglomerate that supposes lower supervision costs or where the supervision 
is less restrictive. 
- Flexibility of regulation. A potential advantage of the unified supervision 
theory resides in a more flexible supervision system. Specialized (sectoral) authorities 
could be hindered from acting effectively in case the judicial status gives rise to doubts or 
they could encounter problems when they have to face particular situations, e.g. when a 
new type of product or institution, which is not covered by the legislation in force, 
appears.   
- Creation of a specialist team. An essential requirement for an efficient 
regulation and supervision is that a regulation agency has to be capable to attract, 
maintain and develop a group of qualified specialists. The unification can bring its 
contribution to this process, a unified agency can be better situated within the definition 
of a human resources policy, including carrier planning and staff related strategies. 
- Improvement of accountability. The final argument in favour of the 
unification is that it improves the supervision related accountability. In a system with 
multiple supervision agencies, it may be more difficult to monitor if the regulation and 
supervision authorities are accountable for their performances, for the costs they 
determine, etc.  
Mayes (2006: p.61) also puts forward the idea of a SSA, which must take the 
responsibility of conducting the regulation and supervision activity and also make prompt 
decisions regarding the problems related to capital adequacy.  
Another argument for the constitution of a SSA and which is not usually 
described in the economic literature is the creation of the framework required to facilitate 
the signature of the Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) between the supervision 
authorities. This argument is mainly related to the need of particular financial 
conglomerates supervision. It is often required to involve institutions from different 
countries, and the conclusion of a MoU between two SSA from different countries is 
more practical than the signature of three or more different MoU, between the sectoral 
supervision authorities in the two countries.  
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A key factor in order for a regulation structure to be efficient is to reflect, up to 
a certain point, the structure of the regulated industry. For example, when the universal 
banks are predominant in the financial system, having significant activities on the capital 
markets, a combined regulation and supervision of banks and securities is preferable. 
Another reason for combining the activities related to banking and capital markets 
regulation is the fact that the risk appears in the assets side of the balance sheet. The 
situation is different for the insurance companies because the main risks are related to the 
liabilities side. However, the synergy between the banking activity and the insurance 
activity (“bancassurance” phenomenon) determined the supervision of these two sectors 
by a joint supervision authority in certain countries – France for example.   
The set up of a SSA has to be realized taking into account the characteristics of 
the financial system and the international context. The development of financial 
conglomerates is in our opinion the main argument that highlights the importance of the 
flexibility of a SSA5. The increase of the number of conglomerates, in which different 
categories of financial institutions, both national and international, are operating, 
determined the regulation authorities to look for efficient methods to supervise them. 
Fragmented supervision can cause problems in respect of risks assessment on a 
consolidated basis. The experience showed that the effective supervision of various 
financial conglomerates imposes certain requirements related to the supervision bodies, 
which are not usually presented in a simple organizational structure. As we will see 
further on, there are solutions both for financial conglomerates supervision at national 
level by means of setting up mixed supervision committees, as well as for the 
transnational conglomerates supervision through the conclusion of MoU.   
The trade-off between banking supervision and monetary policy objectives and 
the excessive power concentration into central banks do not stand for solid arguments for 
setting up a SSA. The importance of the moral hazard is overestimated because the 
central banks can always find the way and the instruments to impose penalties upon the 
managers and the shareholders of an insolvent institution. The excessive power 
concentration can also appear in case of a SSA constitution.    
 
4. The European regulation and supervision framework 
 
There are some issues related to the European regulation and supervision 
framework which must be clarified. The first question that arises is related to the 
opportunity to have a single regulation and supervision authority at European level. 
Secondly, we have to analyse the possibility for the ECB to play this role. Finally, we 
have to establish what supervision framework we should have in place in order to ensure 
a better coordination between national and European supervision authorities. 
The economic literature provides arguments for and against a centralized 
supervision function. One of the objectives of the Lisbon Strategy is the establishment of 
a common European financial system (Goodhart, 2004: pp.12-13). This author proposes 
the transfer of fiscal competences in the management of bank crisis and the transfer of 
banks’ supervision function at central level. In his opinion, these two functions must not 
be separated. 
At present, at European level, there are different committees monitoring the 
identification of systemic risk in each financial sector. These authorities have only a 
                                                 
5
 Financial conglomerates are traditionally defined as groups of institutions which carry out 
activities at least in two out of the following sectors: banking, insurance, securities. They 
“combine banking, insurance and investment services in a single corporation” (Morrison, 2002: 
p.11).  
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coordination role and they do not dispose of adequate intervention instruments. They 
constituted together a Joint Forum for the financial conglomerates supervision which 
recommended the creation of a Mixed Technical Group (MTG), where supervised 
financial sectors should be represented. 
The European supervision framework is shortly described by Gulde and Wolf 
(2004: pp.56-57). At European level, the regulation and supervision intervene at three 
levels: at the first level we have the Ecofin Council, at the second level the regulation 
committees vote the European Commission’s (EC) proposals related to the technical 
measures for implementation and finally, at the third level, the committees advise the EC 
about the measures adopted at the second level and promote the implementation of the 
European Directives and of the convergence in the supervision practices. While the 
institutional structure includes a second level concerning the financial conglomerates 
(and, optionally, a third level), the strategy in place focuses on the individual supervision 
of each sector (Table 2). 
 
Table 2: The framework for Formalized European Co-operation in Banking and Insurance 
Supervision 
 Banking Insurance Securities Conglomerates 
Level 2 
Regulatory 
Committees 
EBC 
European 
Banking 
Committee  
EIC 
European Insurance 
Committee (includes 
Pension Funds) 
ESC 
European 
Securities 
Committee 
FCC 
Financial 
Conglomerates 
Committee 
Level 3: 
Supervisory 
Committees 
CEBS 
Committee of 
European 
Banking 
Supervisors 
CEIOPS 
Committee of 
European Insurance 
and Occupational 
Pensions Supervisors 
CESR 
Committee of 
European 
Securities 
Regulators 
 
Source: Gulde and Wolf (2004: p.56) 
 
Another issue intensely discussed is the ECB role in the financial system 
regulation and supervision. The ECB does not have a statutory responsibility in this field 
and the supervision institutions act at national level. The ECB’s main objective is the 
implementation of the monetary policy and its involvement in the supervision activity 
could have several implications regarding the independence, transparency and 
responsibilities of this institution. The loss of the ECB’s reputation involves more severe 
consequences as compared to the loss of a national central bank’s reputation.   
We wonder if the ECB should not get more involved in the supervision 
activities. We consider that the administration of the TARGET is not sufficient to 
guarantee the stability of the European financial system and we are also aware that the 
ECB can not accomplish a centralized LOLR function. A stronger relation between the 
ECB and the MTG is necessary and, consequently, a much deeper involvement of the 
ECB in the supervision activity. The ECB must represent the link between the MTG and 
the national central banks (NCB) – the only institutions capable to ensure the LOLR 
function.  
A possible supervision framework at European level which show the 
compatibility between the national sectorial supervision framework and the centralised 
supervision structure is presented in Figure 1. The difference between the centralized and 
national supervision framework is the location of the Mixed Supervision Committee 
inside the NCB. This is necessary because the NCB are the only institutions which 
dispose of the appropriate tools for preventing financial instability. The NCB must 
coordinate the Committee’s actions and must take the appropiate decision as soon as 
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possible. At European (central) level, there is only an informative relation between ECB 
and MTG because the intervention instruments belong to the NCB. 
 
Figure 1: A proposal for the European financial supervision framework 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In our opinion, if, at national level, a SSA replaces the Mixed Supervision 
Committee and operates outside the NCB, the resulting supervision framework will slow 
down the decision making process in case of financial stability. At the same time, the role 
of the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) will be considerable reduced. In order 
to have a good coordination and cooperation, the national and central supervision 
framework must have the same structure. 
Another debate in the literature regards the implementation of a European 
Financial Service Authority (EFSA), and this subject gained again the attention in the 
context of the recent financial crisis. Eijffinger (2001: p.1) considers that this 
preoccupation is based on banking and capital market integration trend, this institution 
being able to increase the overall transparency of the banking supervision, but this will 
also suppose the modification of the Treaty.  
We raise the question if this new supervision framework will be more efficient. 
Without performing a cost-benefit analysis, we can reach the conclusion that a good 
collaboration between European and national supervision structures can occur when the 
two frameworks are similar. This means that each member state must implement a SSA 
and we showed that this is not always recommended. The Mixed Supervision Committees 
ECB CEBS - Committee 
of European 
Banking Supervisors 
 
MTG 
CEIOPS - 
Committee of 
European Insurance 
 
CESR 
Committee of European 
Securities Regulators 
 
NCB 
 
 Mixed 
Supervision 
Committee 
Insurances 
supervision 
Securities 
supervision 
European Level National Level 
Banking 
supervision 
Where :           Represents the reports prepared by national supervision agencies for the European 
Committees, which contribute to a better regulation and a detection of each sector’s risks; 
              Represents the information collected by the MSC from each supervision agency and it is 
meant to identify the systemic risks, especially the ones caused by the financial conglomerates; 
             Represents the information exchange for the regulation harmonization and the 
identification of the risks suspected to affect the stability of the European financial system; 
Information about systemic risks at national and central level (double control);             
Represents the ECB and NCB information by the MTG and MSC in relation with 
systemic risk and the implementation of the action plans            
Represents  the Eurosystem coordination process 
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can accomplish an important part of the SSA activity, especially in case of consolidated 
supervision. 
Consequently, in countries where the banking sector prevails and where the 
central banks have an important supervision experience, a decentralized supervision 
framework is more appropriate. The NCB must act as an “umbrella” in the supervision 
activity (the Mixed Committees can be a distinct department within the central banks or 
the Financial Stability Department). Removing central banks from the bank supervision 
activity means a rupture between the monetary policy and stability policy at national and 
European level. The relationship between the ECB and NCB is not a formal one, based 
only on an information exchange like the EFSA – SSA relation. The SEBC implication in 
supervision means coordination and actions based on real intervention tools meant to 
ensure financial systemic stability. Even the specialists which sustain the SSA 
implementation agree that the supervision practices are more important that the change of 
the institutional framework and propose a progressive approach in the supervision 
framework of financial conglomerates. 
 
5. The supervision’s unification trend in Europe and the Romanian case  
 
We described above the centralized supervision framework and a possible 
cooperation framework with the national authorities. We will present bellow the 
particular cases of the SSA implementation in different European countries and we will 
demonstrate that, at present, the unified supervision framework is not appropriate for the 
Romanian financial system.  
In respect of the financial supervision of European Union member states, this 
widely differs from one country to another (Annex 1). No less than 10 countries, out of a 
total of 27, have implemented a SSA before 2004. These countries are: Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Latvia, Malta, United Kingdom, Sweden and Hungary. 
Countries such as: Bulgaria6, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Greece, Lithuania, Romania and 
Slovenia dispose of a specialized supervision for each financial sector. The remaining 
countries have hybrid supervision institutions. 
The first European countries where a SSA was implemented were the Northern 
Countries. The unification of the supervision was necessary after the banking crisis in the 
’80, when central banks failed in applying prudential supervision. Another feature of 
these countries is the high concentration of the financial system and the presence of 
financial conglomerates. The fact that the financial industry in Baltic Countries imitates 
the pattern of Northern Countries, constituted a sufficient reason for the implementation 
of a SSA in these countries too. Many banking groups from Sweden and Finland activate 
in Estonia and Latvia. However, a reorganization of the supervision activity was not 
needed here because the Baltic Countries were confident from the very beginning in the 
efficiency of unified supervision.  
The situation was different in the United Kingdom. The FSA was created in 
1997 in particular due to the inefficiency of the nine supervision agencies which 
performed their activity in this field. By the set up of the FSA, a tripartite cooperation 
agreement was signed between the Bank of England, the FSA and the Treasury. The 
model was also adopted by Ireland. Nevertheless, this supervision framework did not 
                                                 
6
 Bulgaria modified the financial supervision framework by the unification of the supervision 
agencies for capital market and insurance sector (Securities Commission, State Insurance 
Supervision Agency and Insurance Supervision Agency). In this way, the Financial Supervision 
Commission was established, having as main purposes to protect the investors’ interests and to 
increase the transparency of financial markets. 
Central Bank or Single Financial Supervision Authority: The Romanian Case 
 
 15 
prove its efficiency in 2007 when, after the subprime crisis in the United States, the 
Northern Rock from England was affected. The FSA failed in prudential supervision and 
the central bank had to intervene in its quality of LOLR (Buiter, 2007: p.11).  
The HFSA from Hungary was set up in 2000. The main reasons put forward for 
the reorganization of the supervision framework were the interconnection of activities in 
the banking sector, insurances and financial investments. At the same time, the idea of a 
better supervision on consolidated basis was sustained. However, another reason was the 
lack in legislation which resulted in supervision arbitrage.  
In 2002, the BaFin was created in Germany as an SSA subordinated to the 
Ministry of Finance, its activity being financed by the supervised institutions. 
Bundesbank still has a formal involvement in supervision.  
In Malta, a SSA was also set up in 2002 (Malta Financial Services Authority – 
MFSA). In this case the supervision authority is completely autonomous and it reports 
directly to the Parliament. The decision for setting up the MFSA was the result of the 
reform in the financial system legislation, like in Hungary.  
In Belgium, the Banking, Finance and Insurance Commission (CBFA) was 
created in 2004 having as main objective to protect the deponents and the insurants. 
CBFA is also responsible for prudential control. 
The most recent unified supervision framework was established in Poland, on 
the 1st of January 2008, by the set up of the Polish Financial Supervision Authority 
(PFSA). In this case also, the main argument was the presence of financial conglomerates 
and their importance. Until 2008, the banking supervision was performed by the Banking 
Supervision Commission. It was finally proved that the supervision unification was a 
political decision and it does not represent the best option, the central bank remaining de 
facto responsible for the banking sector supervision in Poland.   
We can see that there is a trend related to unified supervision in Europe. But 
not all of these SSA fulfil the independence and credibility criteria, neither do they have 
clearly defined objectives for ensuring financial stability. For example, in Germany, the 
activity of BaFin is financed by the supervised entities, situation that may lead to 
pressures from these institutions. In Hungary, the legislative framework gave room to 
interpretations and to the arbitrage phenomenon. In Poland, the supervision activity of the 
Banking Commission was insufficient. 
Numerous studies focused on the econometric identification of those elements 
which determined the modification of the regulation and supervision framework. Their 
results show that the set up of a SSA mainly occurred in countries where the capital 
market has an important place, the market capitalization reaches a high level, the presence 
of conglomerates is significant and good governance policies are in place, policies 
characterized by high quality services and limited political interference in choosing and 
appointing the governors (Masciandaro, 2004: pp.21-22; Feyler, 2008: pp.13-15). In 
addition, an important factor influencing the creation of a SSA is the central banks’ poor 
experience and involvement in the supervision activity. The independence, authority and 
credibility of the central bank are also important. If a weak involvement of the Central 
Bank represents a status quo, the authorities do not wish an increased involvement in 
order to avoid moral hazard and bureaucratic effects (Masciandaro, 2007: p.3). This is 
called “central bank fragmentation effect”. 
As Abrams and Taylor (2000: p.29) argued, the supervision unification must 
take into consideration at least the following key elements: prerequisites for effective 
supervision (independence, credibility, accountability, clear objectives); regulatory 
framework (presence of financial conglomerates, regulatory arbitrage problems, 
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coordination problems); structure of financial system (dominant banking system; 
presence of universal banks). 
None of the above mentioned elements indicates the need to implement a SSA 
in Romania. The banking sector is the major component of the financial system and the 
NBR enjoys the independence and credibility necessary to enforce an efficient 
supervision. The supervision activity objectives are clearly defined and there are no 
arbitrage cases. The legislative framework does not leave room for different 
interpretations7. The problem related to financial conglomerates exists, but it can be 
managed by a mixed supervision committee. The Romanian supervision framework is 
compatible with the centralized framework and it can thus ensure a corresponding 
information flow.   
One of the Romanian financial system features is a reduced intermediation 
degree and the activity of the insurance companies and financial investment companies is 
limited. The banking sector still remains the most important sector within the financial 
system. NBR presents all characteristics necessary for a supervision authority.  
The financial conglomerates in Romania act mainly in the banking sector: 
Allianz, ING Group, Société Générale, Unicredito, San Paolo, Raiffeisen, National Bank 
of Greece or Alpha Bank. Most of these financial conglomerates are shareholders within 
Romanian banks and insurance companies. Their activity is therefore supervised by 
Romanian supervision authorities, being considered highly important. The national 
legislation (in accordance with the 2002/87/CE Directive related to the additional 
supervision of financial conglomerates), gives the possibility for an additional 
supervision to be made at the level of each group which has the characteristics of a 
financial conglomerate.     
The NBR undertook some safety precautions to prevent the systemic risk 
caused by the financial conglomerates. By adopting the European legislation, the NBR 
has the possibility to appeal to an information exchange with the partner countries 
supervision authorities. Mutual information refers to foreign subsidiaries. Thereby, the 
NBR has concluded MoU with the regulation and supervision authorities from: Cyprus, 
Greece, Italy, Germany, Netherlands, France and Hungary (the origin countries of 
financial conglomerates active in Romania which are considered partner countries in 
prudential supervision). 
The information exchange between national supervision authorities is also very 
important. In our opinion, the cooperation between the NBR and the other supervision 
authorities is not transparent enough, even if a collaboration agreement has been signed. 
This agreement stipulates: a clear tasks delimitation, professionalism and transparency, 
cooperation in regulation, efficiency, confidentiality and an ongoing exchange of 
information.   
This national Agreement (Protocol) was signed on the 10 of March 2006 
between NBR, NSC and ISC. The PPSSC joined the agreement in 2007. The MoU 
foresees quarterly Committees meetings between the decision-making bodies of the four 
authorities: NBR governor, the NSC president, the ISC president and the PPSSC 
president (or between the members assigned to represent these authorities). Five distinct 
Committees are stipulated in the protocol: the Financial Stability Committee; the 
Supervision and Control Committee; the Regulation Committee; the Payment System 
                                                 
7
 NBR is responsible for the regulation and supervision of the banking sector while the insurance 
and securities regulation and supervision are ensured by the Insurance Supervisory Commission 
(ISC) respectively by the National Securities Commission (NSC). In 2007, the private pension 
funds began their activity in Romania and the Private Pension System Supervisory Commission 
(PPSSC) is in charge with the supervision of their activities. 
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Committee and the Financial Statistics Committee. Members of all the parties in the 
Protocol are included in the structure of these technical committees and the presidency is 
ensured based on a rotation procedure. 
As we can see, the collaboration process has a functional disposal. In the event 
of a financial instability period, the information exchange can be slowed down due to this 
spread over structure. These separate Committees do not perform their activity within the 
NBR and their quarterly meetings are not frequent enough. In this case, the information 
exchange can prove inefficient. There is no stipulation related to the organization of an 
extraordinary meeting or to the conditions which can lead to such a meeting. We sustain 
the idea that NBR must be the leading authority in this Protocol because it is the only 
institution which disposes of the necessary tools to prevent a financial crisis. 
At ECOFIN Council recommendations, an additional agreement was concluded 
in 2007 between the Ministry of Finance, National Bank of Romania, National Securities 
Commission Insurance Supervisory Commission and the Private Pension System 
Supervisory Commission for cooperation in the field of financial stability and crisis 
management and for facilitating the information exchange. Based on this agreement, the 
National Committee for Financial Stability was set up.   
 
Conclusions 
 
The arguments for and against the maintenance of the regulation and 
supervision function of the banking sector within the central banks mutually equilibrate 
themselves, none of the two thesis eliminates the other. However, in case of an economy 
whose development is ongoing, including the former planned economies experiencing 
transition nowadays, more factors incline the balance in favour of the integration. Many 
central banks in these countries have been reformed and they enjoy solid guarantees 
related to independence (sometimes guaranteed by the constitution). Their governors’ 
positions are very strong and the central banks have their own financing sources. As 
Schinasi (2003: p.15) noted, “the central banks have a natural role in terms of financial 
stability”. 
We have to mention that the effective supervision can not be guaranteed 
through the modification of the regulation structure and the recent trend to set up a SSA 
at European level does not always stand for the best solution. Buiter (2007: pp.13-16) 
considers that after the failure to prevent the financial turbulences at the end of 2007, the 
supervision structure in the United Kingdom proved its limitations, the FSA being 
inefficient. It is necessary for the central banks to remain involved in this process as they 
are the bodies which have available the instruments necessary to correct the imbalances. 
Through their participation to the ESCB and due to the information access, the 
NCB can gain an advantage in terms of prudential control and systemic risk management. 
The NCB are both a component of the EU structures and national institutions, fact which 
can represent an advantage in solving international issues or issues related to the efficient 
functioning of the European financial system supervision. Unlike these institutions, the 
national supervision authorities which are distinct from the central banks have an 
exclusive national mandate and have only formal or sometimes informal connections with 
the Ministry of Finance in the respective country. In case a problem occurs, these 
agencies show too little interest in systemic aspects.    
Nevertheless, the choice of a certain supervision regime has an endogenous 
nature depending on the economy and on the institutions’ structure, on the context but 
also on the definition given to the financial stability safety nets. Moreover, it is necessary 
to take into account an average or a longer time horizon. 
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The regulation and supervision framework in Romania is a sectoral one. It 
reflects the structure of a financial system where the banking sector has a significant 
share. By the set up of mixed supervision committees between the national authorities, 
the compatibility with the supervision framework, under construction at EU level, is 
ensured and, at the same time, the decision making process gains an increased efficiency. 
However, the functional structure of these mixed committees should be revised to have an 
adequate systemic overview. In addition, taking into consideration the fact that only the 
NBR possesses the instruments required to correct the imbalances, the mixed committee 
should function under the tutelage of this institution. 
We do not exclude the possibility to rethink the Romanian financial supervision 
in the future. One of the most important elements is the remodelling of the European 
supervision framework by the creation of a European Authority of Financial Services (a 
solution strongly rejected by the Romanian authorities at the European summit held in 
October 2008 with the purpose of improving the supervision activities in Europe). 
Another reason is the failure to cooperate in the supervision of financial conglomerates. 
The elimination of the NBR from the banking supervision activity does not represent a 
solution for the present situation and it will not improve the financial supervision 
framework.  
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Annex 
 
Annex 1: Supervision authorities in EU countries 
 
No. crt Country Banks Securities Insurance 
1 Austria U, CB U U 
2 Belgium U U U 
3 Bulgaria CB S I 
4 Cyprus CB S I 
5 Czech Republic CB S I 
6 Denmark U U U 
7 Estonia U U U 
8 Finland BS BS I 
9 France BC, B1, B2, B3 CB, S I 
10 Germany U, CB U U 
11 Greece CB S I 
12 Ireland CB CB CB 
13 Italy CB, S CB, S I 
14 Latvia U U U 
15 Lithuania CB S I 
16 Luxemburg BS BS I 
17 Malta U U U 
18 Netherlands CB, S CB, S I, S 
19 Poland B B,S I1, I2 
20 Portugal CB CB, S I 
21 Romania CB S I 
22 United Kingdom U U U 
23 Slovak Republic CB SI SI 
24 Slovenia CB S I 
25 Spain CB, Bs(**) CB, S I 
26 Sweden U U U 
27 Hungary U U U 
The initials have the following meaning: B = authority specialized in the banking sector; BI = 
authority specialized in the banking sector and insurance sector; CB = central banks; G = 
government; I = authority specialized in the insurance sector; S = authority specialized in the 
securities market; U = single authority for all sectors; BS = authority specialized in the 
banking sector and securities market; SI = authority specialized in the insurance sector and 
securities market.  
(*) = state or regional agencies 
Source: Excerpt from Masciandaro (2004:pp.11-13) 
 
 
